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• Complexity of global 
supply chains and IT 
Systems 
• Use of personal 
devices 





• Lack of cybersecurity 
readiness standards 
and funds 
• Impact of 
cybersecurity affects 
everyone and 
everyone in the 
acquisition community 
impacts cybersecurity 
What has been 
done 
• Change in focus - not 




• Development of cyber 
risk modelling 
• Increased use of 
cloud enabled 
Cybersecurity 
• Use of Big Data and 
advanced 
authentication 
• Availability of Risk-
based frameworks 
What needs to 
be done 
• Treat the unknown 
and knowable 
• Asses the acquisitions 
cyber risks 




• Understand the 
different effects of all 
persons and all 
positions 
• Develop and 
implement advanced 





Cybersecurity Challenges in Acquisition 
Roadmap 
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Challenges Improvements Opportunities 
• Inadequate and/or inconsistent security technology 
implementation 
• User lack of cybersecurity knowledge proper to their 
role and responsibilities 
• Incomplete requirements are created by people who do 
not understand the cyber technology or the cyber 
threats 
• Poor design by people that do not understand the latest 
cyber security methods 
• Poor testing, by people that do not fully understand the 
threats, produces unreliable results 
93% of Cybersecurity Breaches Are 
Caused by Human Error 
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• Cybersecurity external attacks get plenty of attention 
• Insider (i.e., connected companies, direct employees)  
attacks posse a more pernicious threat 
- Easier access to systems 
- Much greater window of opportunity 
- Less information available 




The Risk of Insider Threats Is 
Underestimated 
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Incidents Related to Business Partners 
Increased in 2015* 
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2014 35% 30% 18% 15% 13%











* Adapted from the PwC The Global State of Information Security® Survey 2016, 
~ ~ 
~ ~ 
Supply Chain Business Partners 
Global Nature of Most Supply Chains 
Adds an additional Layer of Complexity 
6 
Cost Benefit Analyses Underestimate the 











- Communicated as 
abstract and complex 
potential event 
- Is not perceived as an 
intentional moral 
transgression 





- Treated as an expense 
- Absorption costing is 
not used (include IT 
and cybersecurity 





- Government subsidies 
- Corporate responsibility 
 
Financial Impact 
- Losses are so small 
compared to the 
revenue for large 
organizations 
- SEC reporting 
requirements are not 





Cybersecurity Risk Management Practices  
































1 Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 
2 UK Cabinet Office 
High-Reliability Organization 






















underpinned by  
the highest quality 
of staff and training 
High-Reliability Organizations 
U.S. Navy’s Nuclear Propulsion Program 
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Integrity 
• Internalized idea that leads people to fully comply with protocols 
• People who own up immediately their mistakes 
Depth of knowledge 
• Identify when something is not properly working 
• Handle anomalies more effectively 
Procedural compliance 
• Workers know – or know where to find – proper operational procedures 
• Follow them to the letter 
• Identify procedure upgrades 
Forceful backup 
• High risk actions have to be performed by two people 
• Any member of the crew can stop an action when a problem arises 
A questioning attitude 
• Make workers to: 
• Double and triple-check their work 
• Remain alert for anomalies and are never satisfied with a less-than –thorough answer 
• Asses cybersecurity risks from an acquisition 
perspective 
• Use insurance for commercially developed systems 
• Implement KPIs to monitor cybersecurity progress as a 
whole and acquisition specific 
• Complete cybersecurity knowledge gap research  
 
Recommendations & Research Path 
Forward 
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